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BOMAS, MISSIONS, AND MINES; THE MAKING OF CENTERS ON THE
ZAMBIAN COPPERBELT
Brian Siegel
In his introduction to the 1978 Conference papers on Small Urban Centers in Rural
Development in Africa, Southall (1979: 1-2) suggests that the relations between these
centers and their hinterlands are largely oppressive and exploitative, and, in the
absence of fundamental social transformation, unlikely to change. The Zambian rural
centers studied by this author (Siegel, 1979) strayed some from this general pattern.
Nearly all were relatively recent extensions of the national and provincial governmental
agencies. And given Zambia's foreign exchange crisis at that time, and the consequent
shortage of goods and services of every kind, the influence of these peripheral centers
was far more ineffectual than exploitative.
Exploitative relations did exist, but these were focused upon the continuing political,
economic, and social domination by the neighboring "primate" cities of Ndola and Luanshya, both of which were colonially created administrative, commercial, and industrial
centers in Zambia's historically dual and increasingly polarized economy (Baldwin,
1966: 40- 57, 214-21; Barber, 1967; Southall, 1979: 14). When combined with the
foreign exchange crisis, the producer's price structure then in effect had so limited rural
livelihood opportunities in central Ndola Rural District that nearly half of the able-bodied
males had left their homes to single women, the very old, and the very young (Siegel,
1984: 104-8). Zambians in general disparage the drudgery and poverty of "sleepy"
village life, and this is especially true in the Copperbelt, where there is an 80-year-old
history of derogatory stereotypes about the "backward," "weak," and "lazy" Lamba
villagers (Siegel, 1984: 54-85, & n.d.).
The notion that urban centers are oppressive and exploitative of their hinterlands has a
history of its own, as reflected in the various theories concerning the origin of the state
(Service 1978). Hoselitz (1955), among many others, reached similar conclusions in his
discussion of the permanent "parasitism" of colonial centers, the technical and
economic enclaves found in dual economies. Barber (1967) later extended Hoselitz's
views to the cities of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. While finding that "the
relationship between urbanization and economic growth in this part of the continent is
ambiguous," Barber said that the African benefits from such centers were "weak" and
tended toward the parasitic--particularly in regard to the European controls over all
forms of production, over wages and income distribution, and the consequent limitations
placed upon African farmers (pp. 114, 118-19). But such ideas are not limited to liberal
academicians. For in his 1951 comments upon the "demoralized" Lamba cultivators of
rural Ndola District, their grinding impoverishment, and the youthful exodus to the cities,
the District Commissioner acknowledged that these were the consequences of
"economic and social forces at work which it was difficult, if not impossible, to control"
(NR n.d. d).
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There is, then, a general consensus that the poverty and stagnation of the rural
Copperbelt, while neither new nor peculiar to that region, are not what modernization
theorists might expect one to find near such centers of Westernization and industrial
development; these conditions can be traced to the "parasitic" mining and industrial
centers of the colonial political economy (e.g., Fetter, 1976; 1983). Jewsiewicki (1977),
Vellut (1977) and M'Bokolo (1985), among others, are re-writing the colonial social
history of southeastern Zaire. But apart from the earlier studies by Luchembe (1974)
and Shillington (n.d.), this same contact period has not been well documented south of
the colonially established border, in the Zambian Copperbelt.
While I admit its limitations, this study in Lamba ethnohistory (between approximately
1850 and 1930) examines the "parasitism" of the region's centers in both the late
precolonial and early colonial periods. In brief, it says that the impoverishment of the
Copper Belt and its peoples, while traceable to precolonial events, took a new and more
consistent form under the colonial political economy.

PRECOLONIAL TRADING SITES AND CAPITALS
As in much of the Central African savannah, the small and scattered Copperbelt
chiefdoms of the Copperbelt and Shaba Provinces (including the Lamba, Lemba,
Temba, Seba, and Lima peoples) along the Zaire and Zambian border never developed
any known market-places or urban centers during precolonial times. While somewhat
surprising in view of the archeological evidence for copper mining, smelting, and trading
operations in this region from the 14th and 15 centuries (Phillipson, 1977: 128-33, 17277, 193-94) the lack of such central places probably reflects the techno-environmental
constraints upon food production and settlement densities (Miracle, 1969: 217-19). Thus
the itinerant caravan traders touring the region by the 1850s were naturally drawn to the
chiefly capitals, centers of redistributive exchange relations, where they might find
protection, food, slaves, and other prestige goods.
The fortunes of these and neighboring chiefly capitals were often tied to natural trading
or craft production centers. These included the salt, iron, and copper deposits and the
elephant hunting grounds along the Kafue Hook and the western Kafue Basin, to the
south (Rennie and Mubita, 1985); the Kecila and Mwanshya salt pans along the
Lualaba and Lufira Rivers, to the north (Grevisse, 1950); and the copper workings at
Kansanshi and in southern Katanga (Chibanza, 1961: 112-13; Page, 1972; Roberts,
1976: 105). Groups of southern (or Rhodesian) Lamba and their neighbors, the subjects
of this paper, formerly migrated to work the Mwanshya salt pans of the Bena Ngoma
and Lamba chiefs Mwanshya and Lukoshi (Cuvelier, 1932: 12-13; Doke, 1931: 110-11;
Grevisse, 1950: 55). And, including slaves working for their freedom, they also
constituted one-third of the estimated 900 miners at Lemba chief Katanga's copper
workings during their peak production years. In return for this labor, Chief Katanga sent
the Lamba and Seba chiefs gifts of copper, and he mediated their exchange relations
with the Nyamwezi traders (Marchal, 1939: 15-16).
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The Copperbelt chiefdoms, however, were also linked to still earlier and larger chiefly
centers and their transcontinental trade routes. By 1800, for example, copper ingots
from the Lunda empire were sold at the Mbangala trade fair at Cassange (Vellut, 1972:
88-90). These, like supplies of salt and slaves, almost certainly originated as tribute to
Mwata Kazembe's capital on the Luapula River (Beadle, 1873: 188, 221-3, 228-31;
Burton 1873: 99; Cuvelier, 1932: 175; Marchal, 1939: 10, 17, and 1946-47: 85-6). By
mid-century, however, the Lunda trade monopoly had been broken. In the west, the
Chokwe and Lwena expansions gave Mbundu and Mambari traders access to Mwata
Yamvo's former tributaries (Vellut, 1972: 143-57). Further east, the Luba, Bemba, and
Ngoni expansions allowed Msiri's Yeke (Nyamwezi) and Swahili gunmen to seize
control of Kazembe's Copperbelt tributaries by exploiting chiefly rivalries and succession
disputes in southern Katanga (Grevisse, 1950: 48, 66-7; Marchal, 1939:14-16; Tilsely,
1929: 134-41; Verbeken 1956: 37-65). Still other Yeke captains raided as far as the
Kaonde, Lamba, Lima, and Lenje chiefdoms in Zambia's upper Kafue Basin (Chibanza,
1961: 59-61, 102-13; Doke, 1931: 41-2; NR n.d. a; Verdick, 1952: 34-41).
About 1880, Msiri moved from the chiefdoms near Kambove to settle in the Lufira
Valley. His new capital, called Bunkeya by the Belgians, was the largest of the Copperbelt's precolonial centers: "an immense and cosmopolitan metropolis" of some 25,000
people in 42 contiguous villages (Tilsley, 1929: 135-6; also Verbeken, 1956: 80-81; Verdick, 1952: 32-40). Frederick S. Arnot, the resident Plymouth Brethren missionary there
from 1886-8, was understandably impressed by Bunkeya and the scope of the
Katangan trade:
At Msidi's capital I have met with native traders from Uganda; the Unyamwezi
country; the Ungala, to the east of Lake Tanganyika; the Luba country, almost as
far down as the Stanley Falls; the basin of the Zambezi; Zimbu, Bihe, and
Angola, as well as Arab traders from Lake Nyassa and Zanzibar. Copper, salt,
ivory and slaves are the chief articles of commerce. In exchange for these Msidi
purchases flint-lock guns, powder, cloth, and beads, besides many other curious
things that these native and Arab traders bring (Arnot, 1889: 235).
While Arnot was drawn to Katanga by Livingstone's accounts of the slave trade, it was
the rumors of its mineral wealth that interested Cecil Rhodes and King Leopold II. The
1884-5 Berlin West Africa Conference awarded the entire Congo Basin to Leopold's
Etat Independant du Congo (EIC). Yet by October 1890, when the British South Africa
Company (BSAC) was chartered, the Belgians had yet to set foot in Katanga. So
Rhodes decided to challenge Leopold's claims by sending three separate envoys to
treat with Msiri. Of these, only Alfred Sharpe reached Bunkeya, in November 1890.
Msiri, however, refused to place Katanga's mineral wealth under Queen Victoria's
protection, and, after just 10 days, angrily sent Sharpe back to Karonga (Macpherson,
1981: 43-44, 72-73; Verbeken, 1956: 166-70). Advised of Rhodes' designs, Leopold, in
August, had ordered the EIC to establish its presence in Katanga. But the first of three
Belgian expeditions to Bunkeya was unable to leave the Sankuru District post and
Lusambo until Christmas Day of 1890 (Verbeken, 1956: 181; Verdick, 1952: 20-22).

3

Msiri's empire, however, was already in decline. The trade caravans leaving Bunkeya
depended upon slaves for transport. Yet the Yeke and Swahili slave raids in Katanga
fostered localized rebellions, reduced the flow of tribute, and eroded the Yeke monopoly
on external trade. Copper production in Chief Katanga's area, for example, fell by 80
percent as Lemba villagers either fled to the Aushi chiefdoms along the Luapula or, like
the neighboring Lamba, fled to the bush, abandoning mining and smelting operations in
favor of wild rubber sales to Mbundu traders (Marchal, 1939:1 2-17; also Capello and
Ivens, 1886: 51, 157; Verbeken, 1956: 124-27, 130-32). The local Sanga, Misiri's allies,
envied his trade monopoly, and by the time the first Belgians reached Bunkeya, in April
1891, the Sanga were also in rebellion. They abandoned Bunkeya, cut off its food and
gunpowder supplies, and so transformed it into "'just a stinking hole, a waterless and
shadeless valley, where there [was] nothing but a few villages and sorghum plots"' (Dr.
Briart, in Verbeken, 1956:82; also Verbeken, 1956:171-79; Verdick, 1952:45-47).
While suspicious of the Belgians and their mineral interests, Msiri needed powder and
allies against the Sanga rebels. So, in June, he permitted two Belgian and 30
Dahomean solidiers to establish Lofoi Post, 30 miles east of Bunkeya on a site once
occupied by a Lunda tribute collector (Verdick, 1952:36, 42, 47-54). However the
Belgians made their assistance contingent upon Msiri's acknowledging the EIC's
sovereignty. This he refused to do, believing, when the second expedition left in
October, that Alfred Sharpe and BSAC would soon return to chase the Belgians from
Lofoi (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911: 39; Verbeken, 1956: 169-70, 202, 210-12;
Verdick, 1952: 32-4, 54-5, 58). Captain Stairs' group of Britons did arrive from
Bagamoyo in December 1891 and were warmly welcomed. But they proved to be
Leopold's mercenaries rather than envoys from Sharpe. Within a week of their arrival, in
attempting his arrest, Msiri was shot dead. The Yeke empire collapsed, and Bunkeya
was abandoned—at least until 1910, when smallpox, Belgian food demands, and
presumably, word of the 1911 impot indigene prompted the Yeke to return (Verbeken,
1956:212-51; Verdick, 1952:55-60; Higginson, 1979:116).
Such were the precolonial centers in the Copperbelt. By exploiting natural trading and
craft production sites, the chiefly capitals became tributaries of the Lunda and Yeke
capitals. While still controlled by Africans, Bunkeya's extractive system became so
parasitic that competition between the BSAC and EIC only hastened, rather than
caused, its inevitable collapse.

CHIWALA'S SWAHILI AND ANGLO‐BELGIAN ANTAGONISMS
During the Copperbelt's endemic famine, warfare, and locust and rinderpest epidemics
of the early 1890s, the EIC forces at Lusambo were so preoccupied with the Arab and
Swahili slavers farther east that the garrison at Lofoi, a 10-week journey away, was left
to its own devices for nearly two years (Delvaux, 1950: 36-37, 42; Verdick, 1952: 5865). Though eventually supplied from Lake Mweru by the African Lakes Company after
1897, Lofoi Post was also isolated from the Yeke of Mukanda Bantu, Msiri's son and
successor. They welcomed the EIC's protection from the Sanga and as Belgian
4

sentinelles were appointed to collect and deliver food and ivory from their assigned
villages farther south. The Belgians decided to follow and in 1898-9 abandoned the
mosquito-infested site at Lofoi for Lufaku Post (Fetter, 1976: 18; Lambert-Culot, 1972:
276-7; Vellut, 1977: 298; Verdick, 1952: 62, 78, 110-12, 128-9, 146). There, to supply
his troops with food, Captain Verdick organized the Copperbelt's first marketplace and
hosted chiefly beer drinks to discuss "their rights, their duties, the benefits of
civilization," and "the evils of slavery, as exemplified by the Lamba lands, which the
slavers had gradually depopulated" (Verdick, 1952: 148; Miracle, 1969: 224-5).
Following the collapse of the Yeke empire, the worst of these southern Katangan
slavers were the eight bands of Nyasaland Swahili affiliated with Chiwala. They not only
exacted slaves and ivory from the Lamba, Lala, and Aushi chiefdoms between the
Kafue River and Lake Bangweulu, but after repulsing a Belgian patrol in 1896,
threatened the Plymouth Brethren, who had moved to Lake Mweru and Luapula two
years earlier (Doke, 1931: 33-7; Stephenson, 1972: 22-33; Verdick, 1952: 74; also
Gelfand, 1961: 66-7; Tilsley, 1929: 412, 415).
When the Belgians and their Yeke and Luba auxiliaries finally drove these Swahili from
their Luapula stockade in November 1897, Chiwala and some 150 armed men crossed
the Pedicle and its southern border to Frank Smitheman's prospecting camp at Ft.
Elwes (north of Mkushi), then the only British presence in the region. Assured of
immunity from the EIC, they returned to the familiar territory of Lamba chief Mushili
further west, settled on Ndola's Itawa Stream, and resumed their raids (Delvaux, 1950:
48-54; O'Brien, 1957; Stephenson, 1972: 33-41; Verdick, 1952: 73-7, 118, 120-23).
“An Arab called Chiwallah", as George Grey observed, on his first prospecting
expedition to the Katangan border in July 1899, "...is much feared by the natives in the
neighborhood, and has established a reign of terror over a considerable area" (Grey,
1901: 73). Cornered in the Copperbelt, Chiwala's Swahili altered their livelihood to
include rice farming from their new stockade village. Whereas most of their new Lamba
and Lima captives were kept as domestic slaves, others were redeemed with ivory.
They then traded the ivory to the Mbundu, or by 1900, to Adolph Bolle and William
Ziehl, unscrupulous Luapula traders who were wanted by both the EIC and BSAC
authorities (Chesnaye, 1901: 46-7; BSAC, 1903: 446; 451-3; Delvaux, 1950: 77-82;
Macpherson, 1981: 90-91; Stephenson n.d. a; 1937: 77; 1972: 29).
The North-Eastern Rhodesian authorities had yet to occupy the Copperbelt and only
established Chiwala's whereabouts in May 1900, when Secretary C.P. Chesnaye, a
manager for Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., and the BSAC Collector for the new Serenje
and Ft. Rosebery Bomas entered his village to establish his loyalties, and to win his
help in arresting Bolle and Ziehl (Chesnaye, 1901; Macpherson, 1981: 91; Stephenson
n.d. a).
Unlike the Belgian officers of BSAC Collectors, the administrators at Ft. Jameson had a
higher regard for these Nyalsaland Swahili than for the peoples that they raided.
Whereas Collector Kennelly, like Delvaux (1950: 37, 42) and Verdick (1952: 118-23) in
5

Katanga, held the Swahili responsible for the concealed and abandoned villages of the
"shy", "scattered", and food-short Lamba he had encountered west of Chiwala's village,
Secretary Chesnaye (later, Acting Administrator) instead, admired Chiwala's orderly
village, the Swahili's industry, their "well-fed and prosperous appearance", and
Chiwala's "friendly attitude" (Chesnaye, 1901: 46-7). Chesnaye was not the first
administrator to favor the Swahili, for two years earlier Lt. Delvaux received a letter from
Johnston Falls (Old Ft. Rosebery) which demanded compensation for the prisoners,
livestock, and ivory which "'poor old chief Chiwala'" had lost when he was driven from
the Pedicle (Delvaux, 1950: 53).
This was only one in a series of incidents which fostered Belgian suspicions about the
BSAC and its designs. The EIC had won the contest for Katanga, but it still had to deal
with the Plymouth Brethren missionaries, who were suspected of espionage and of
subverting African loyalties, and unscrupulous British traders, who not only smuggled
ivory and rubber across the frontier, but traded with the rebel Tetela soldiers farther
north (Delvaux, 1950: 59, 72-84, 88; Verdick, 1952: 88, 125, 150). What was worse, the
EIC, with never more than six Belgians in Katanga before 1900, was dependent upon
the British—on the African Lakes Company—for provisioning its southeastern forces,
and on Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. (TCL), a partially owned BSAC subsidiary, for
pegging and developing Katanga's mineral wealth (Fetter, 1976: 18-19).

EARLY COLONIAL CENTERS IN THE RHODESIAN COPPERBELT
The BSAC's claims to the Copperbelt were initially based on the 1890 treaties collected
by explorer Joseph Thomson—particularly his November 1890 treaty with Lamba chief
Mushili (Faber, 1917: 1; Krishnamurthy, 1969). Though hired by Rhodes to treat with
Msiri, Thomson's caravan was carrying smallpox and had to return to Blantyre after
reaching the Kafue and Lenje chief Chipepo (later entitled Mukonchi) (Thomson, 1893).
Given Rhodes' hand in this, it is not suprising that the Rhodesian Copperbelt was
occupied by prospectors and mining camps before the earliest administrative centers
were established. These extractive "collection posts," to borrow Lambert-Culot's (1972:
302-3) terminology, not only preceded the "outposts of occupation," but they were
generally separate, and there was rarely any doubt that the former were meant to be
served by the latter.
The first European presence in this region, Ft. Elwes, was established in the Irumi Hills
along the Katangan border. Frank Smitheman's (1896-8) prospecting party was sent
from Bulawayo by Rhodesia Concessions Ltd. to look for gold in the Muchinga
Mountains, west of Ft. Jameson. But they built Ft. Elwes against an anticipated, but
never realized, threat of hostile Ngoni warriors. It was there, as mentioned earlier, that
Chiwala's Swahili sought protection from the Belgians at the end of 1897 (Bulpin, 1959:
163, 177-8, 214; O'Brien, 1957; Stephenson, 1972: 41; Verdick, 1952: 123). While only
occupied for about a year, Ft. Elwes seems to have been the Smitheman expedition's
greatest success, for it found no mineral deposits. Yet on his return Smitheman
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prepared a report on the availability of Yeke and other North-Eastern Rhodesian labor
for the mines in Bulawayo and South Africa, and Collins, a member of his party, traveled
to the Kafue River in 1901 as a labor recruiter for the Kimberley mines (Bulpin, 1959:
214, Sampson, 1956: 8). This report is of particular interest here, for while it endorses
the labor potential of the Lamba's Swaka, Lala, and Aushi neighbors, Smitheman
doubted that the "very timid" Lamba could "be very much use for work" (Smitheman, in
Macpherson, 1981: 150).
Frank Lewis, Orlando Baragwanath, and the other Northern Copper Company
prospectors were more fortunate. Between 1897 and 1902, three of these expeditions
discovered most of the abandoned copper workings in the northern Kafue Hook and the
Rhodesian Copperbelt--like the Sable Antelope, Nchanga (near Chingola), and Bwana
Mkubwa (Ndola) mines, as well as new deposits of silver at the Silver King, copper at
Roan Antelope (Luanshya), and Broken Hill's (Kabwe) lead and zinc. Mining began at
the Silver King by 1900, and for a time it seemed certain that the projected Cape-toCairo railway would be routed through the Kafue Hook (Bulpin, 1959; Gelfand, 1961:
118-19; Jones, 1903; RCM, 1978: 18-21; Shaw, 1952).
Such plans, however, were eventually scuttled following George Grey's Congo border
expendition of 1899. Sent from Bulawayo by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. under its
contract with the Compagnie du Katanga, Grey, together with four prospectors and 25
armed Africans, claimed the Chambeshi, Nkana (Kitwe), and Kansanshi copper
workings on the southern side of the border, and the Lufira gold pans and Kipushi
copper workings to the north (near Kambove). These latter discoveries persuaded the
newly chartered Comite Special du Katanga to grant Robert Williams' TCL exclusive
prospecting and mining rights in southern Katanga, as well as a share of the future
profits (Chibanza, 1961: 112-13; Fetter, 1976: 19-22; Grey, 1901; Perrings, 1979: 9-10;
RCM, 1978: 19, 51, 64).
With Kansanshi as its base, Grey's second, much larger expedition in 1901-2 established a network of grain trading and labor recruiting camps, located another 50
Katangan copper deposits and cut a 350-mile wagon road from Nkala Mission to the
new Kansanshi mine (Gann, 1964: 119-21; Gelfand, 1961: 120-23; RCM, 1978: 19-21;
Scannell, 1961). Besides routing the future railway through Katanga, Grey's operations
along the upper Kafue Basin and the Katangan border were ultimately responsible for
ending the Copperbelt slave trade.
Still sparsely populated today, the area between the Lunga and Luswishi Rivers was an
elephant hunter's no-man's-land between the Kaonde to the west, and the Lamba and
Lima farther east. Here, since the 1850s, the Mbundu and Mambari ivory, rubber, and
slave trading caravans had established staging posts, with temporary huts and gardens,
where smaller trading parties would reassemble before returning toward Lake Dilolo and
Bihe (Denny, 1957: 334; Gelfand, 1961: 73; Steel, 1917: 182-4; Vellut, 1972: 131-9).
The same area later attracted settlements of Yeke, Chikunda, Mbwela, and Swahili
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(nearly all of whom dealt in slaves) and by 1900, at least a dozen European traders.1
Localized slave raiding not only threatened the lives and property of these European
traders, but the food and labor supplies to the 50 Europeans who were based at
Kansanshi and Kafue Hook mines between 1899 and 1902.2 The Mbundu and Mambari
still operated with impunity, but their slave caravans now had to cross Grey's Nkala-toKansanshi road and so had difficulty escaping notice (Gelfand, 1961:79).
Continued slave raiding and trading were clearly incompatible with European mining
and commercial interests, and in August 1900, three BSAC agents settled in NorthEastern Rhodesia, east of the Kafue River. These were agent Val Gielgud, from Kalomo
at Muyanga Station near the Northern Copper Company's Kafue Hook camp at Ninga;
and Collectors F.E.F. Jones and J.E. (Chirupula) Stephenson, from Ft. Jameson in the
northern and eastern areas of Kafue District. While Gielgud's assignment was to report
on local conditions and to prepare its peoples for peaceful administration, he used his
20 Ndebele Native Police to harass the slave traders, and by staging punitive raids
against hostile Ila, Lenje, and Soli villages, to impress these peoples with the power and
prestige of the callous Europeans in their midst (BSAC, 1903: 407; Denny, 1957;
Gelfand, 1961: 39-40, 79-82; Macpherson, 1981: 87-90). Gielgud and Grey's complaints
about the slave traders brought Colonel Harding and the Barotse Native Police to patrol
1

These European ivory and rubber traders' accounts are drawn from Sampson's (1956) catalogue of
early Northern Rhodesian residents, and supplemented by Bulpin (1959) and Stephenson (1937).
Since most of these individuals are listed in Sampson (1956), I have omitted references to this
source. It should also be kept in mind that these ivory and/or rubber traders also pursued other
careers in grain or cattle trading, mineral prospecting, labor recruiting, or the BSAC administration.
Aside from Albert Bolle and William Ziehl, and the Swahili's outlaw trading partners near Ndola,
these ivory and/or rubber traders included Adolph Ullman at Kapopo (Doke 1975: 44; Masters and
Masters, 1920: 21-3, 47-8; Moubray, 1912: 103-4); L. Stem, who worked near Ndola before his death
in 1902 (Stephenson, 1937: 163); and George Hepburn and John Lanegan O'Keefe, who traded
among the Kaonde on the upper Lunga River (Gelfand, 1961: 151; Stephenson, n.d. a and 1937:
147). A certain Price abandoned rubber trading in the Nchanga area for a mine stores job at Ninga,
on the Kafue Hook (Bulpin, 1959: 223-4, 232), and Louis De Fries seems to have traded near Kapopo
before being appointed the Kafue Hook Rubber Conservator (BSAC 1903: 416-17; Hobson 1960:
494-5; Stephenson, 1937: 163-75, 210). Stephenson also mentions a Swedish elephant hunter and
ivory trader near old Mkushi Boma (Stephenson, 1937: 163-4).
Other traders dealt in grain, cattle, or other unspecified goods. Zimmerman, Diammoch
(Sampson's C.A. Dimmock?), Norton, and James Green all traded for grain in the Kafue Hook
(Gelfand, 1961: 120; Stephenson, 1937: 269). Argenta, an Italian, Pereira, and an anonymous
Portuguese dealt in cattle along the Kafue River, as did Alfred F. Miles and Ernest D. Fairbanks, who
was killed by the Soli in 1901 when he tried taking some to Southern Rhodesia (Bulpin, 1959: 188,
191, 193, 195, 244; Stephenson, 1937: 148-54, 164-5, 192-7). An Eduardo, a Portuguese, was on the
Kafue in 1898, and a "Dutch" trader, Strakan, was near old Mkushi in 1901 (Stephenson, 1937: 148).
2

These 50 Europeans from 1899-1902 represented nearly one-half of those reported in the
Rhodesian Copperbelt and the Kafue Hook area. This tally is largely drawn from Sampson (1956), but
is supplemented by those mentioned in Bulpin (1959), Chesnaye (1901), Clark (1955), Gelfand
(1961), Grey (1901), Scannell (1961), and Stephenson (n.d. a; n.d. b; 1937). This total of 103
Europeans included seven Primitive Methodist missionaries, their wives and children; 19 BSAC
officials; 23 traders; 50 prospectors and mine employees; and four individuals involved in some
combination of prospecting, mining, labor recruiting, or trading activities. The tally of 50 does not
include four of the eight members of the Smitheman expedition, for these seem to have left NorthEastern Rhodesia in 1898.
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the western side of the Kafue River in 1900 and led to the opening of the Nkala and
Kasempa police camps in 1901, and of Kasempa Boma in 1904 (Chibanza, 1961: 68-9;
Clark, 1955; Gelfand, 1961: 79; Rennie and Mubita, 1985: 53).
Collectors Jones and Stephenson, by comparison, had been sent to both occupy and
administer the areas to the north and east, yet had just 10 "Nyasa" (Lakeside Tonga)
askari apiece (BSAC, 1903: 407, 419). While Stephenson had no trouble opening the
old Mkushi Boma in September 1900, Chief Chipepo's slave raiding Lenje, in August,
gave Jones such a hostile reception that he evidently decided to accept an Mbwela
elephant hunter's invitation to open his boma at Kapopo, along the upper Kafue River
(Denny, 1957: 331-34; Macpherson, 1981: 29, 88; Stephenson n.d. b & 1937: 82-92).
But the Lima near Kapopo Boma were also involved in the slave trade, and, in early
1901, threatened a general Lima, Lenje, Swahili, and Chikunda rebellion after one of
their chiefs was killed while attempting to escape from jail (NR n.d. a; Stephenson,
1937: 203-9). Though this affair was settled peacefully, the Kapopo Boma was
effectively abandoned in 1903, when Jones returned to Wales. Perhaps Jones feared
that he, like Stephenson (1937: 97, 238-41), had been targeted for revenge by
Chikunda assassins. Kapopo, though, was not completely abandoned, for by 1905 it
was occupied by Adolph Ullman, a Jewish ivory and rubber trader from Bavaria (Doke,
1975: 44; Masters and Masters, 1920: 21-3, 47-8; Moubray, 1912: 103-4).
Like the early Belgian posts at Lofoi and Lukafu, Muyanga Station and the Kapopo and
Mkushi Bomas were, in Lambert-Culot's terminology, "outposts of occupation". Whereas
many of the early BSAC bomas and Comite Special du Katanga posts along Lakes
Tanganyika, Mweru, and the Luapula were established as "frontier surveillance posts"
or resource "collection or transit posts" (Lambert-Culot, 1972: 302-3), Muyanga,
Kapopo, and Mkushi were established to protect and advance European mining and
commercial interests in areas which had only recently "been taken in hand" (BSAC,
1903: 406). By establishing an effective colonial presence, these new and alien centers
were meant "to impress upon the inhabitants that they were now under new, powerful
masters who had to be obeyed" (Rennie and Mubita, 1985: 53).3
In the Copperbelt, the first real test of this obedience came in 1901, when, as in most of
North-Eastern Rhodesia, Jones and Stephenson introduced the 3 sh. hut tax
(musonko). This was initially collected in porterage or road construction work between
the Kapopo and Mkushi Bomas. But as this "tax labor" option too closely resembled
forced labor, taxes had to be paid in cash or in kind after 1902. This was changed to a 5
sh. cash tax in 1905, when the region was incorporated into North-Western Rhodesia,
and to 10 sh. by 1910 (BSAC, 1903: 408; Doke, 1931: 48; Gann, 1964: 103-5;
3

Fetter (1983: 87), instead, stresses the role of these early bomas in the "security arrangements to
ward off both competing European powers and the strongest African monarchs." Macpherson (1981:
72-3) here includes the surveillance of Kazembe, the Bemba, and the Arab-Swahili trade route across
the African Lake Company's Stevenson Road "at a time of extended lines of communication and a
minimal supply of personnel." Many of the same bomas were later used to limit migrant labor to Katanga
during the 1907-12 sleeping sickness scare (Gelfand, 1961: 196- 211; Perrings, 1979: 15-18).
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Macpherson, 1981: 191; Stephenson, 1937: 215-26). The tax required cash and as
Stephenson (1937: 221) later observed, cash meant wages and the consequent
disruptions of labor migration to the mines. Since the tax and administrative (but not
commercial) revenues for the 1901-02 fiscal year covered only 28 percent of NorthEastern Rhodesia's expenditures, the purpose of the hut tax was to encourage the flow
of recruited (chibaro) labor to the Southern Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (Gelfand,
1961: 96-7, 151-2; Macpherson, 1981: 129, 148, 157-8; Perrings, 1979: 14-15).
These new tax and labor demands were widely resented, especially around Kansanshi
and the Kafue Hook mines. The Silver King alone employed 1,000 laborers by the end
of 1901, plus another 700 porters. But the customary floggings there, as well as other,
more tortuous forms of managerial discipline, led to frequent labor desertions from the
very beginning. Traders and mine employees also beat neighboring villagers and stole
their wives and cattle. So the tax collection efforts only fueled anti-European sentiments
(Macpherson, 1981: 89-90, 194-5). Beginning with Mwomboshi Boma (south of Broken
Hill/Kabwe) in 1902, a wider network of bomas and police camps were established
between the Kafue and Luangwa Rivers, where shackles, floggings, and hut and
granary burnings were commonly used to punish tax defaulters. The Ila took up arms in
1905 and again in 1907, but were put down both times by a Barotse Native Police
detachment and its Maxim gun (Gelfand, 1961: 48-9; Macpherson, 1981: 89-92, 111-13,
120-4, 198; Masters and Masters, 1920: 157-65; Stephenson, 1937: 265-9).
The Lamba, by comparison, adopted more peaceful means of resistance. Tax collection
was limited, at first, to the areas nearest Kapopo and Mkushi Bomas (BSAC, 1903: 408;
Stephenson, 1937: 227). So long as Jones and Stephenson remained preoccupied with
slave traders, and with the slaving, ivory and rubber smuggling activities, and inheritance disputes among Chiwala's Swahili, the Lamba villagers were able to evade their
tax and labor obligations by hiding in the bush. This, however, became more difficult
after 1902, when a BSAC Rubber Conservator was posted to Chiwala's (Ndola) village
(BSAC, 1903: 416-7; Hobson, 1960: 494-5); and nearly impossible after July 1904,
when, "in order to keep an eye on the [Swahili] Coastmen...and to help the Europeans
now developing Bwana Mkubwa [mine]," Stephenson opened the first Ndola Boma
(near Monkey Fountain Park), to the west of the later town (Stephenson n.d. b; also
Brelsford, 1965a: 295-6; Jordan, 1956; Stephenson, 1965b: 117-18). As Stephenson
(n.d. b) later described it, this was a time of "latent hostility, unsubmissiveness, and civil
disobedience (as far as could be dared!)."
Latent hostility and unsubmissiveness was the Lamba response to Stephenson's
notoriously agressive administrative style. When first at Mkushi, "Chirupula" (The
Flogger) Stephenson had earned quite a reputation for flogging Lala and Swaka tax
defaulters, and for destroying their crops, huts, and granaries (Macpherson, 1981: 91-2;
Stephenson, 1937: 174, 188-92, 215-36). So when he demanded Lamba laborers to
work on the road between Ndola and Mkushi, Chief Mushili refused and fled to a
Katangan Lamba chief living near Mokambo (NR n.d. b, 1: 151-6; Stephenson n.d. b;
1937: 105). As the 1901-2 BSAC Administrative Report suggests, these forms of civil
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disobedience only confirmed prospector Smitheman's earlier stereotype of the shy and
lazy Lamba:
The Kapopo division [of Kafue District] is inhabited by several tribes, by far the
most important being the Walamba. …Hut tax was not enforced this year. Labour
for local work is always plentiful, but it is almost impossible to get these people,
who are both indolent and timid, to go long journeys. Small-pox caused
considerable mortality, but was fortunately confined to a very small area and is
now disappearing. Crops were always good, but up to last season scarcely
sufficient to meet requirements...
...The tribes in the Kapopo division, and notably the Walamba, exhibit more
criminal tendencies than any others in the portion of the [North-Eastern
Rhodesia] territory under report....They are utterly untrustworthy, abandoning
loads which they have undertaken to carry, or work which they have agreed to
do, without the slightest reason (BSAC, 1903: 411, 419).
The first missionaries to the Rhodesian Copperbelt soon became similarly disappointed
in the local Lamba. While eventually taken over by the South African Baptist Missionary
Society in 1914, Kafulafuta Mission (southeast of Luanshya) was opened in December
1905 by two new English recruits to the Nyasa Industrial Mission near Blantyre (Cross,
1925; Masters and Masters, 1920: 1-26, 166-212). Their initial enthusiasm soured, however, when the "disorganized but docile" Lamba, whom they counted "among the laziest
of African people," proved less interested in the mission's Gospel than in its wages, its
day school, and the limited training it provided in brick-making and carpentry (Masters
and Masters, 1920: 181, 214).
Thus the early colonial centers in this portion of the Central African Copperbelt were, in
chronological order, the prospectors' camps and mines, the bomas, and the mission.
While usually sited separately from one another, the bomas, and—given its industrial
emphasis, even the mission—were designed to serve the extractive "collection posts"
established by mining and commercial interests. By enforcing the hut tax, the boma
officials tried to create a pool of migrant labor. But the Copperbelt bomas and its
mission also helped generate the self-perpetuating ethnic stereotypes which
rationalized early European disappointments with their uncooperative colonial wards
(Siegel, 1983 and n.d.).

THE MINES AND THE TOWNS: KANSANSHI, NDOLA, AND LUANSHYA
For nearly a decade Kansanshi was the most important center in both the Rhodesian
and Katangan Copperbelt. Besides its role as the operations base for the TCL's
Katangan headquarters—sited at Kambove (1901-4), Ruwe (1904-10), and L'Etoile
(after 1910)—it was, by 1908, the base for 16 white miners and four labor recruiters, a
medical doctor (from 1901-14), a nearby shopkeeper, and three white farmers. There
were, at the time, another five officials and about a dozen white traders between the
Kabompo and Kafue Rivers (Gelfand, 1961: 123-4; Perrings, 1979: 12-14, 19).
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Kansanshi must have served them as well, for it was still the major transport depot north
of the Broken Hill railhead (est. June 1906), and nearly 28,000 porters carried 650 tons
of cargo from Broken Hill to Kansanshi, Kambove, and L'Etoile in 1908. "Chirupula"
Stephenson's transport firm then employed 9,600 carriers, and took 80 passengers from
Broken Hill to L'Etoile (near Elisabethville/ Lubumbashi); and Adolph Ullman, the
Kapopo trader and the largest of the transport agents, employed 16,000 porters and
took 65 passengers to Kansanshi and Kambove via Kapopo (Gelfand, 1961: 115;
Moubray, 1912: 103-4). Given this volume of activity, a sub-station of Kasempa Boma
was opened at Kansanshi in 1909 (Clark, 1955: 64).
The mine at Kansanshi also made it a major labor center. By 1913, a year before
operations were suspended, Kansanshi employed 85 "local" (Kaonde) and 788
"imported" laborers, who were originally Ndebele. This number may have been lower
than in earlier years, for, as in Katanga (Hoornaert n.d.), there was much resentment of
the coercive methods used by the TCL's "dago" labor recruiters. This, combined with
the mine's poor food and seven day work week, and the terror generated by a head
capitao's anti-European witchcraft cult, led to an ever worsening labor shortage (Gann,
1964: 123-4; Gelfand, 1961: 101-3; Macpherson, 1981: 167; Perrings, 1979: 21).
Relations with the Kaonde began deteriorating when the first district hut tax was
introduced in 1907. The aggressive tax collection methods then in use had literally
forced many Kaonde into the hands of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau recruiters.
Many such recruits never returned from Bulawayo, for their mortality rates were more
than double those of other laborers (Gelfand, 1961: 98-102). Recruiting by the Labour
Bureau in Kasempa District was ended in 1912 when, following the bloody manhunt for
the revenge murderers of a Swedish prospector and the attempted shooting of the
Kansanshi Sub-District Officer, "It became clear that the Kaonde were in a dangerous
mood" (Clark, 1955: 64; also Chibanza, 1961: 70-74; Macpherson, 1981: 161-4).
Further east, the development of the Bwana Mkubwa mine languished until September
1909, when the railway arrived and the mine replaced Broken Hill as the railhead to
Katanga (Gann, 1964: 125-7; Gelfand, 1961: 114-15). The railway contractors had hired
Katangan Lamba gangers for the line from Broken Hill to Elisabethville (Gann, 1958:
159). But because the BSAC had already used the Luapula sleeping sickness scare to
check the flow of African laborers to Katanga, it was thought that the use of these
imported laborers threatened to spread the disease to the rest of the northern
Rhodesian territories (Fetter, 1976: 41; Gelfand, 1961: 100; Gouldsbury and Sheane,
1911: 227, 348-9; Perrings, 1979: 15-18, 27-8, 38-44). To allay these groundless fears,
a medical officer was posted to Ndola Boma in March 1908 to certify that these laborers
were free of infection (Gelfand, 1961: 185, 200). The three mud and pole bungalows
that constituted Old Ndola Boma lay well to the west of Bwana Mkubwa and the trail to
L'Etoile (Jordan 1956). Thus when R.R. Sharp left L'Etoile in 1908, he found the "first
outpost of civilization"--and a case of Guinness stout--at J. Thom's store on the
Kafulafuta River, south of the mine (Sharp, 1956: 94).
The Ndola Boma medical officer was moved east, near the railway contractors' compound, in July 1909. The new Ndola village was just under construction, and included
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the African Lakes Company and Stephenson's trade and transport firms. By March
1910, most of the Europeans in Ndola District were in or near the village. These 58 men
and six women included 17 at Bwana Mkubwa and 16 with the railway, 13 traders and
seven on farms, five government officials, the five Kafulafuta missionaries, and one
labor agent. As Ndola assumed many of Kansanshi's former functions, the Old Ndola
Boma was abandoned for the railway site in 1911 (Brelsford, 1965a: 295-6; Gelfand,
1961: 124, 240-41; Masters and Masters 1920: 47).
There is, unfortunately, no known count of Ndola's African population at this time. Native
Commissioner Moffat Thomson's village regrouping campaign, by destroying scattered
family villages, probably encouraged some Lamba to settle near Chiwala's village,
where the Swahili were growing rice and maize for sale (Jordan, 1956; Macpherson,
1981: 179; Masters and Masters, 1920: 213). Others were probably drawn to the railway
and Bwana Mkubwa compounds, for by the 1920s, when the Swahili were moved to the
north and east of Ndola, Lamba market gardeners were scattered around the mine and
the various railway sidings south of Ndola (NR n.d. c: 1925 and 1926; NR, NRC n.d. 1:
312 and 2: 23, 31-4, 40, 46, 82-3, 92, 117-18).
Though the effects of the railway were far less dramatic than in Elisabethville, where it
arrived in December 1910, it did increase Ndola's demand for labor and also made it a
major labor transit center. Once Robert Williams and Company's Northern Rhodesian
labor recruits were permitted to return to L'Etoile in May 1911, those coming by rail had
to pass the inspection of the Ndola Boma medical officer (Fetter, 1976: 41; Gelfand,
1961: 103). But the railway ran south as well, and it placed most of northeastern
Northern Rhodesia within a three week journey of Bulawayo and the other southern
mines (Gouldsbury and Sheane 1911: 328, 345-6). As the competition for Northern
Rhodesian labor increased, the Belgians interpreted this interest in African health
concerns as yet another plot by the BSAC and its president, L.S. Jameson of the
Jameson Raid, to control Katanga by manipulating its labor supplies (Fetter, 1976: 4171; Perrings, 1979:3 8-44, 50-54).
Ndola gained greater prominence as a transit center during World War I as the railhead
for the German East African campaign. Porters carried supplies across the Pedicle from
Ndola to Kabunda, and then, following an African traders' route, canoed up the Luapula
to Lake Bangweulu and the Chambeshi and Lukuku Rivers (Gelfand, 1961: 273;
Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911: 330-31). Because of their work in the Katangan mines,
the peoples of the Mweru-Luapula region were not conscripted as war carriers until
1916. So a good portion of the government's 193,000 "native carriers", and probably
most of the government's and traders' 39,100 porters from the northwestern districts,
must have passed through Ndola (Fetter, 1976: 60; Gelfand, 1961: 273-5). Ndola
District, like those of Mkushi and Serenje, lost most of its able-bodied men to the
conscription effort, and it suffered from the Spanish influenza epidemic afterwards
(Cross, 1925: 26; Doke, 1975: 73, 171-81; Macpherson, 1981: 169-70, 175-6; N R n.d.
c: 1920). Until 1926, the Ndola "native carriers" continued to take mail and cargo as far
as Solwezi and Abercom (Mbala) Bomas (NR n.d. b 1: 172).
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After the war, most of the Africans employed in Ndola District were working for white
farmers, traders, or the railway. Most of the Kafue Hook mines had closed in 1907,
when the Ila rebellion coincided with a drop in world copper prices. The Sable Antelope
and Kansanshi closed by the end of 1914, and Bwana Mkubwa in 1920 (Doke, 1975:
110-11; Gann,1964: 122-3; RCM, 1978: 22). Thus the 75 Europeans in Ndola District in
1921 were only 10 more than in 1910. These and their African employees are listed
below by enterprise.
Whereas Elisabethville's population jumped from 8,000 to 15,500 between 1913 and
1923 (Fetter, 1976: 33-4, 74), Ndola remained a relatively small administrative and
trading center. Then in 1922, two years before surrendering the Northern Rhodesian
administration to the British Colonial Office, the BSAC sold extensive land tracts in
Ndola District to large multinational mining corporations. Following the sudden infusion
of capital, the Bwana Mkubwa, Kansanshi, Roan Antelope, Nkana, Mufulira, Nchanga,
and Chambishi copper claims were all being mined or under development by 1930
(Gann,1964: 206-9; RCM, 1978: 22-31). Beginning in the mid-1920s, Ndola became the
main commercial and distributive center in Northern Rhodesia. Geologists, prospectors,
miners, contractors, traders, and their families poured through the Ndola railway station,
and the District's European population rose from the 75 in 1921 to 518 in 1925, and
from 4,247 in 1929 to 6,790 in 1931, at the beginning of the Copperbelt Depression (NR
n.d. b 2: 484; NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1926 and 12/1929).

CENSUS OF EUROPEAN RESIDENTS AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES NDOLA DISTRICT.
MAY 1921
Enterprise
Farms
Commercial
Railways
Boma
Missions
Mines
Unemployed
Totals

European
Males
5
12
14
8
6
2
3
50

European
Females
3
9
3
4
4
2
25

Total (%)

Africans (%)

8 (10.7)
21 (28.0)
17 (22.7)
12 (16.0)
10 (13.3)
4 (5.3)
3 (4.0)
75 (100.00)

342 (27.2)
237 (18.8)
210 (16.7)
201 (16.0)
198 (15.7)
70 (5.6)
1258 (100.00)

Source: NR n.d. b2: 484
The District's African population also rose, for beginning in December 1925, the
administration began directing its migrant laborers to the Copperbelt by setting
diminishing quotas for migrants to Katanga (Fetter, 1976: 89). While the early
employment data are incomplete and tend to obscure the high turnover rates, they
indicate that almost 4,000 Africans--nearly 85 percent of them from Nyasaland and from
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eastern and north-eastern Northern Rhodesia--were working on the Ndola District mines
in 1926, and 15,000 in 1929 (NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1926, 12/1926, and 12/1929).
These same events also affected the local Lamba of Ndola District. First, they became
hosts to immigrant Lamba and Seba villagers from Katanga. These had been hounded
by the insatiable food and labor demands of the Pedicle's private labor recruiters, and
then driven from their lands to accommodate an anticipated influx of white farmers
along the railway corridor between Sakania and Elisabethville (Fetter, 1968: 51-2; Higginson, 1979: 152, 175, 179-82; NR, DNA 1933; NR, NRC n.d. 1: 31, 59, 219, and 2:
46, 59). Second, though the majority of the 1,258 African laborers in the District in 1921
were probably Lamba, a good deal more Lamba had had experience in wage labor by
1926. Though the figures are suspiciously high, 4,146 Lamba and Lima--over half of the
District's 8,000 taxable males--seem to have taken some term of wage labor in 1926:
1,300 with the District's mines, and 1,000 with those in Broken Hill District (probably
including prospecting and contractor's work); 646 with the Administration; 600 with the
railways' "permanent way gangs" and the building of new spur lines; 300 with the aerial
prospecting surveys (cutting landing strips, as well as clearings at 20-mile intervals);
and another 300 with the District's six white farmers (NR n.d. c: Report 12/1926).
This rapid population increase posed new problems for Ndola's Village Management
Board, established in 1920. The old village, clustered about the railway depot, could not
accommodate the demand for European business and residential plots. By 1928, when
the government Survey Department was laying out an extension grid, many of Ndola's
whites had already taken plots on a former farmer's private township to the north. Under
the provisions of the 1929 Town Planning Ordinance, the developed portion of this
estate was eventually annexed to Ndola (Gardiner, 1970: 5-8).
Less attention was given to the housing needs of Ndola's African population. As in
Elisabethville, servants and their families were generally allotted quarters in their
employers' yards, while all others were expected to build their own housing in the
private employers' or government camps on the periphery of town (Epstein, 1981: 1822; Fetter, 1976: 34, 57, 115-16). The miners were Bwana Mkubwa's problem. Towns
like Ndola were viewed as European enclaves, and while Africans were permitted to
work and trade there, they were not considered acceptable residents (Gann, 1964: 14648).
Still, the crush of African immigrants was such that it compelled the Village
Management Board to open Ndola's Main (or Old) Native Location to the south of town,
on the eastern side of the railway and Itawa Stream in 1927. The same spatial
segregation, supposedly for hygienic reasons, characterized the European and African
townships of Elisabethville. The Main Location was divided into wards of some 40 to 60
one-room houses. Its residents were still under European control, for their rents were
often paid by their employers. Yet from the very beginning these residents also included
independent rate-payers, such as ivory workers, tailors, and other artisans. By 1929
these included two or three carpenters and "shoemakers" (the Copperbelt tin smiths),
and two bakers. There were as yet no licensed African shopkeepers in the entire
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District, so it is likely that most of the African retail trade was entrusted to hawkers
working for European merchants. As the Management Board carefully restricted the
approval of bakehouse applications, it would appear that, like the African teashops in
the 1950s, the sale of buns and scones was already a popular avenue of African
enterprise (Epstein, 1981: 19- 20; NR n.d. c: Reports 12/1926 and 12/1929).
The siting of the newer mines, like Roan Antelope, was solely determined by the
location of copper sulphide ores. Unfortunately for its workers, those at Roan Antelope
were found within a swampy horseshoe bend of the Luanshya River--the home of the
monstrous funkwe snake of Lamba legend (Doke, 1927: 246-9, and 1931: 318-19, 3523; Stephenson, 1965a). Thus when exploratory drilling in early 1926 justified further
development in 1927, the residents of this squalid camp--some 40 Europeans and 900
Africans (NR n.d. c: Report 12/1926)--were afflicted with malaria and blackwater fever,
and with pneumonia, typhus, and dysentery. Not surprisingly, the average African
laborer in 1927 left the site after just three months (Gann, 1964: 209-10; Fisher, 1969;
RCM, 1978: 28-32; Rodger, 1962; Watson, 1953: 13-14, 92-3).
The local Lamba attributed Roan's high mortality rates to the funkwe snake and avoided
the mine. But their fears only complicated Roan's labor problem until 1928, when, with
the General Manager's full cooperation, the citrus farmer "Chirulupa" Stephenson
arranged for the snake's exorcism (NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1926, 12/1926, 12/1927,
12/1929; Stephenson 1965a). The Lamba's aversion to underground work—together
with their developing grain and market gardening industry, persistent food shortages in
the area, and “kaffir-pox" epidemics—probably best explains why the Lamba were
blackballed from Roan Antelope, where management regarded them as undisciplined
and unreliable laborers of an inferior physical type (Spearpoint, 1937: 1-9;NR DNA
1934: 30). Thus here, as in Katanga, the Lamba who did come to town were poorly
represented among the African miners, who were mostly long-distance migrant laborers
(Higginson, 1979: 218; Mitchell, 1954: 30, 32, and 1973: 295; Siegel, 1984: 381-2, 39091).
Roan Antelope was Ndola District's first company town. And while technically prohibited
from doing so, the mine township opened five shops and began building its own hospital
long before the government's Survey Department could determine the location for the
public township (Luanshya) and its trading area (Gardiner, 1970: 10-11). As a company
town, Roan avoided much of the sprawling confusion which had marked the settlement
of Ndola and Broken Hill (Gardiner, 1970: 5-8, 22-23; Gelfand, 1961: 240-44). But this
also meant that Roan's residents lived there at the sufferance of mine management,
and were allocated housing according to their rank in the mine's hierarchy.
Here, as elsewhere, racial segregation was the rule, and Africans were assigned to
thatched, mud brick rondavels. These were later converted to African married couples'
quarters after 1929, when the "bachelors" were assigned to the "mosquito-proof" baked
brick houses, with concrete floors and corrugated roofs, which were built as part of the
malaria control program (Gann, 1965: 210-11; Perrings, 1979: 115n). Within the Roan
universe, the compound manager and the black mine police had greater power than the
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government officers, and it was the former who introduced the Tribal Elders Council in
1931. While created to settle miners' domestic and personal disputes according to
necessarily flexible notions of customary law, this novel institutional so gave the Roan
workers an unintended sense of independence from European authority (Epstein, 1958:
1-47 and 1981: 25-6; Fetter, 1976: 149-50; Spearpoint, 1937: 19-20).

THE LAMBA AND THE NATIVE RESERVE
The copper boom of the 1920s also transformed life in the rural Copperbelt. The
increased demands for food and labor hurt the mission and white farmers most, for they
were unable to compete with the higher prices and wages paid by the mines and the
towns (NR n.d. c : Reports 3 /1925 and 12/1926) and with the new, less onerous
produce marketing opportunities for earning tax monies. Whereas European traders
bought 4,000 200-lb bags of sorghum and maize in Ndola District in 1922, they bought
10,000 bags in 1927 and this does not include the sale of sweet potatoes, peanuts, or
cassava (NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1923 and 12/1927).
Together with the four "Koba" (Goan?) Mohammedi brothers who serviced the Bwana
Mkubwa hotel and mine mess, Chiwala's Swahili seem to have been the leaders in the
local produce marketing trade. As "the most expert agriculturalists in the country", the
Swahili hired Lamba and other African laborers on their maize, sorghum, and dairy
farms, selling to the Bwana Mkubwa and Nchanga mines (NR, NRC n.d. 1: 151; also 2:
3, 8, 20, 28). The Swahili responded to this demand by growing more crops for sale, as
was to be expected, but it appears that the Lamba, though a backward tribe and poorly
thought of by those who know them (a missionary living among them says that the
"smart boys" in his Mission school invariably have non-Lamba blood in them), were
imitating Swahili methods and growing bigger crops in consequence (NR, NRC n.d. 1:
44-5).
Though this 1926 summary underestimates the role which the Kafulafuta Mission
evangelists played in the proliferation of Lamba "kitchen gardens" and in early market
gardening near Ndola (NR, NRC n.d. 2: 46; NR n.d. c: Report 3/1925), it does explain
the "inflated" wage and price demands experienced by the mission and white farmers.
Grain and vegetable sales, by offering an alternative to wage labor, created "a tendency
on the part of the villager to break away from tribal control and settle on his own near
the local labour centres where he may live undisturbed and get a good price for his
produce" (NR n.d. c: Report 3 /1926). Local produce sales permitted the Lamba and
their neighbors to seek employment on their own, strictly seasonal terms or, if they
chose, to avoid it altogether (NR, NRC n.d. 1: 312, and 2: 23, 31-4, 40, 46, 53-4, 82-3,
92, 117-18). As a perceptive Boma officer observed, this only contributed to the
European stereotypes of the local Lamba:
The local native is not very popular with a number of employers of labour who
consider him particularly stupid and dislike his tendency to work for only a month
or two at a time. Agricultural products have a ready market in an area with so
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much mining activity and the local man naturally prefers to get his money in this
way by which he can live at home (NR n.d. c: Report 12/1926).
But the Lamba had still other reasons for avoiding wage labor. For among the many
migrants to Ndola District was Jeremiah Gondwe, a Tumbuka witch-finder and
Watchtower movement prophet. As a leader in the final colonial episode of the
Copperbelt's millenarian tradition, Gondwe surreptitiously preached among the
Rhodesian Lamba from 1924 until his 1929 arrest. Unlike the murders incited by Tomo
Nyirenda (Mwana Lesa) among the Lala to the east, Gondwe ran afoul of the
administration for prophesying that four million black Americans would fly in to deliver
the Lamba from the colonial regime and its chiefly puppets (Rotberg 1965: 140-6).
Following his 1932 release, Gondwe and his followers settled south of Luanshya near
Ibenga at the new Franciscan Fathers' mission on the Kafulafuta River (Cross, 1970
and 1973: 271-84; Siegel, 1984: 368-70).
The Lamba were particularly receptive to Gondwe's religious resistance movement, for
during 1926 the Native Reserves Commission held hearings along the Copperbelt lineof-rail to decide how to vacate Lamba villagers from areas of existing and prospective
mine and railway development. Formally instituted in 1928, the Ndola District Native
Reserves recognized Chiwala's successor as a proper chief, awarded the Swahili their
own reserve, and promised them compensation for their loss of lands. Lamba chief
Mushili II, on the other hand, lost 80 percent of his territory without any compensation
and most of his 23,000 Lamba crowded onto the fragile and sandy reserve lands
nearest Luanshya, Ndola, and the railway corridor grain traders (Allan 1949: 26, 35, 42;
NR n.d. c: Reports 12/1926 and 12/ 1929; NR, DA 1944: 5-6; Pim and Milligan 1938:
66-9). While the Reserves Commission's official intent was to protectively isolate the
Lamba from any future disturbances (NR, NRC 1: 75-76), its latent intent--in recognizing
the "large body of evidence that the native having his home up against a centre of
employment, tends to become a producer rather than a labourer" (NR, NRC 1: 312)-was to make cash-cropping so difficult as to compel the Lamba to enter the labor
market. And they eventually did.
The administrative, commercial, and industrial centers of the Northern Rhodesian
Copperbelt eagerly promoted economic development, but from 1900 to 1930 this meant
the mines, and development was defined in strictly European terms. As the Lamba
villagers were chased into the Lamba-Lima Native Reserve, the size and productivity of
their gardens fell as increasing numbers of able-bodied men and women began drifting
off into the towns. There, in dominating the low prestige occupational niches filled by
house-boys, beer hall girls, and temporary wives, the urban African townsfolk
sterotyped the impoverished Lamba as weak and backward country bumpkins. While
aspects of these invidious stereotypes were eventually internalized, they also generated
the internally resentful dimension of the Lamba ethnic identity--that of a people who
believe that shrewd and clever strangers have systematically cheated them of the
Copperbelt's lands and its mineral wealth (Siegel n.d.)
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Ironically, the Rhodesian Lamba did enjoy a brief, if wretched, prosperity from
prostitution and suburban beer sales during the Depression and even hired unemployed
townsfolk to cultivate their gardens. The Lamba in Katanga, while farther from the town,
had a similar experience. For among these "poor devils at war with want", as District
Commissioner Vermuelen described them:
...there has never been so much cash in the natives' hands than at present
[1935]. The crops were abundant and they sold it all to the point where they
haven't enough to feed themselves. A few weeks ago, the natives were even
selling the little sorghum remaining to them in order to buy calicos. They need to
be taught some prudence here, for by not properly feeding themselves, they
expose themselves to all the epidemics (CB, AIMO n.d.: 9).
While the Belgians tried to arrest this impoverishment by introducing compulsory village
regrouping and foodcrop cultivations in the 1930s, such measures, together with higher
taxes, only succeeded in driving at least 500 more Katangan Lamba across the border
and into the overcrowded, northern third of the Lamba-Lima Native Reserve
(Jewsiewicki, 1977: 327-9; Joset n.d.; Ziegleck n.d.).
There conditions continued to deteriorate until unusually heavy rains destroyed the
1939/40 sorghum crop, which precipitated the 1940/41 famine. Given the role which the
Native Reserve played in their impoverishment, the following description of the Lamba
in 1935 is steeped in cruel, if unintended irony:
Physically the Lamba-Lima people are good looking and well built but not
particularly strong. They are intelligent, outspoken and good humoured but
unenterprising and have no business instincts and lack ambition. In spite of their
proximity to the Copper Mines and opportunities for money making, they remain
poor and except for their gardens, huts, and few primitive agricultural
implements, a spear, and rarely, a muzzle loading gun, they are without
possessions. They have a decided inferiority complex probably owing to their
past experience when their country was a happy hunting ground of the slave
trader from both East and West. They are to-day easily exploited by Natives from
other tribes and have been willing victims of the Watch Tower movement which
to-day is to some extent kept alive among them by natives of other and more
cunning tribes. They are, however, strangely resistant to external influences on
their daily habits of life, and village life has, as far as one can tell, been little
influenced by the neighboring industrial development and the near presence of a
mass of natives of other tribes (Keith n.d.: 6)

SUMMARY
As suggested in this paper, the early colonial centers are not wholly responsible for the
impoverishment of the Zambian Copperbelt's people. While it is difficult to assess Dr.
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Lacerda's 1798 information that the "Arambas" were "peaceful friends of the Cazembe",
the demands of the Lunda empire were not so great as to prevent the Lamba from
working Chief Katanga's copper, Chief Mwanshya's salt pans, or from trading with the
Africans living near the Portuguese post at Zumbo (Burton, 1873: 99; also Doke, 1927:
166-9, 370, 403, 452). Yet it is clear that these earlier redistributive exchange relations
with the chiefly capitals changed to brutal parasitism in the late 19th century, when
Msiri's Yeke at Bunkeya turned from extorting Lamba tribute to raiding them for slaves.
The Belgians and British also wanted the region's mineral ores and demanded Lamba
food and labor. While their competition for Katanga saved the Lamba and their
neighbors from Swahili and other slave traders, their outposts of occupation used the
hut tax and the impersonal forces of the cash economy to extract local labor for the
mines of Central and Southern Africa. The railway to Katanga created new urban
centers and still higher levels of hut tax prosecutions (Fetter, 1983: 91-2); but in
introducing a flood of labor migrants, it also provided the Lamba with an alternative
cash-generating opportunity in the marketing of grains, root crops, fruits and vegetables.
The Kafulafuta Mission encouraged this response, which was, perhaps, the single
greatest spillover effect of the dramatic urban and industrial development in this part of
Africa.
The rural consequences of the Copperbelt's colonial centers were, however, largely
parasitic. Under the political economy established by the British South Africa Company
(and the Comite Special du Katanga to the north), economic development was defined
in strictly European terms and apart from the short-lived attempts to attract white
farmers, was synonymous with the growth of the Copperbelt's industrial, administrative,
and commercial centers. The African role in this development was in providing cheap
labor. So when these centers unintentionally fostered a class of relatively autonomous
African produce traders during the 1920s copper boom, the Lamba were chased from
their peri-urban settlements onto the Native Reserve, where overcrowding and the
inevitable ecological collapse forced increasing numbers into the urban labor market.
Justifying this formula for rural poverty and economic stagnation was a set of invidious
ethnic stereotypes which, while based upon the Lamba's historical response to the
introduction of colonial rule, blamed the Lamba for their conditions (Siegel n.d.).
Such stereotypes still endure today and continue to taint the Lamba's relations with the
Copperbelt townsfolk and with other, more fortunate immigrant farmers (Siegel, 1984:
250ff). Rural life continues to revolve around the social, economic, and political
domination of these primate centers. The good life, by definition, is not to be found in
the Copperbelt's villages. Such scarce monies for agricultural loans as do exist are
necessarily directed, instead, to a few, better endowed family farmers. Thus much of the
rural Copperbelt is still home to the very old, and to female-headed households (Siegel,
1979). Village life may have its rewards, but these defy any reckoning in monetary
terms.
While the indigenous poverty of the Copperbelt can be traced to its precolonial history,
its rural stagnation is an artifact of the parasitic centers first established by the colonial
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political economy. This brand of parasitism differs from that described by Bert Hoselitz
(1955). He explained the permanent parasitism of colonial centers in terms of the
disjuncture between the "orthogenetic" centralization of political and cultural forces,
such as one might find in the urban centers of India or Indonesia, and the
"heterogenetic" externalization of colonial economic forces. But Hoselitz's colonial
centers were all pre-colonial capitals which later had been captured by intrusive,
colonial economic interests. The Copperbelt's centers have nothing to do with the
perpetual elaboration of indigenous political or cultural traditions, or with notions of
sacred or economic space. Instead, all began as new and alien centers which were
created, and then grew at the expense of the surrounding rural populace. In this
respect, the Copperbelt centers are examples of a more radical form of parasitism.
In a recent, spatial analysis of the colonial centers in Malawi, Zambia, and Zaire, Bruce
Fetter (1983) refutes the alternative forms of economic determinism espoused by
dependency theorists and geographers. He argues, instead, for the primacy of political
considerations in the siting of such centers and the consequent regional inequities in
development. "Early colonial administrators," he says, "were far more concerned with
the establishment of their colonial regimes than in pleasing capitalists." So in
determining the colonial landscape, "the colonizers' political demands shaped the lives
of Africans more than economic ones, though the two factors are not easily separable"
(pp. 28-9). As Fetter (1983: 26, 192-3) admits, however, Northern Rhodesia, and the
Copperbelt in particular, is a special case. The first outposts of occupation in these
northern Rhodesian territories, after all, were established by the collectors for the British
South Africa Company. And while such collectors opened Kapopo and Mkushi Bomas
for purposes of political pacification, the ending of slave raids and the slave trade was
designed to protect and promote still earlier mining and trading interests in the
Copperbelt. Their early tax collection efforts represented more than a demonstration of
coercive authority. For like the village regrouping campaign in the 1910s, and the
removal of villages to the Native Reserves in the 1920s, this was also a bid for
economic control over Lamba livelihoods and labor.
In my view, it is not only difficult, but impossible to disentangle the political and
economic interests which created the Copperbelt's parasitic centers and their legacy of
rural stagnation. In this part of Central Africa (and including much of old Katanga), it
makes little difference whether one emphasizes the political or the economic
considerations. The distinction is artificial, for they were complementary and mutually
irreducible aspects of the same peculiar political economy, one established during the
period of Chartered Company rule.
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